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 In § 33 of Being and Time, Martin Heidegger shows that judgment is a derivative 
phenomenon, and it owes its sense to the phenomenon of world.  Later sections further root 
judgment in care and most originally in the self-articulation of timeliness.  This could lead to the 
impression that phenomenology simply outflanks judgments.  And yet every page of Being and 
Time teems with judgments.  Each of the careful phenomenological analyses, from space to 
judgment to anxiety, deploys judgments to articulate the phenomena.  Peculiarly, 
phenomenology uses judgments to situate judgments within a non-judicative context.  Is 
Heidegger here guilty of a gross performative contradiction and methodological naïveté?  Does 
Heidegger use the ladder to kick away the ladder as Carnap, Habermas, Edwards and others 
suppose?
1
  
 Being and Time has its tensions and contradictions, but this is not one of them.  We know 
from reading the methodological § 7 that judgment or logos of any sort is in service to the self-
showing of phenomena.  Timeliness, we later discover, introduces an essential bifurcation in the 
phenomena and thus implicates an essential difference between phenomenological and scientific 
judgments.  Specifically, the horizonal-ecstatic unfolding of timeliness enables two different 
1
 Jürgen Habermas criticizes what he calls Heidegger’s “esoteric, special discourse, which absolves itself of 
the restrictions of discursive speech generally and is immunized by vagueness against any specific objections.”  
Habermas thinks this disguises a “performative contradiction” in Heidegger’s approach: “He makes use of 
metaphysical concepts for purposes of a critique of metaphysics, as a ladder he casts away once he has mounted the 
rungs.”  The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: The 
MIT Press, 1987), 185.   For similar claims, see Rudolph Carnap, “The Elimination of Metaphysics through the 
Logical Analysis of Language,” trans. Arthur Pap, in Logical Positivism, ed. A. J. Ayer (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free 
Press, 1959), and, more recently, Paul Edwards, Heidegger’s Confusions (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2004).  
 2 
directions of inquiry.  Scientific judgments are the result of turning from the timely openness to 
entities alone; phenomenological judgments are the result of returning to the timely openness in 
which such entities are accessible.  Timeliness, then, makes the judgments differ in kind.  
Consequently, there is no contradiction for phenomenological judgments to be used to situate 
scientific judgments within a pre-judicative context.   
To clarify the matter further, we could say that these two ways of judging are not 
univocal but analogical.  That is, while what they signify is different, they are proportionately the 
same: scientific judgments are subordinate to the self-showing of entities as phenomenological 
judgments are subordinate to the self-showing of the timely horizon in which such entities can 
show themselves.  Both are a way of “letting be seen” (Sehenlassen), but they differ because they 
manifest two essentially different possibilities of phenomena, the entitative and the timely.
2
  The 
latter is the condition for the possibility of the former.  In this way we can see that Heidegger 
affirms the validity of science and its judgments as a legitimate possibility of discourse.  He does 
think it entails a particular way of regarding things that is not the only way or even the most 
adequate way, but it is still a valid one.
3
  Contextualing scientific judgments within their ultimate 
horizon of sense enriches science and does not undermine it. 
In registering this difference between the two judgments, we are hampered by the fact 
that the third division of Being and Time never appeared.  In it, Heidegger tells us, he intended to 
develop the idea of phenomenology he had merely indicated in the methodological § 7.
4
  
2
 Sein und Zeit, 18th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2001), Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie 
and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1962), 32-35/56-60, hereafter SZ.  Throughout we 
will first list the pagination of the German edition followed by an English translation, should one be available (G/E). 
3
 Saying of the hammer, “It is too heavy,” is closer to life and so more meaningful than saying, “The 
hammer has such and such a mass.”  The latter is true but less meaningful than the former, since the former has 
regard for the world as the context of sense. 
4
 Heidegger says that the transition from the preliminary conception of § 7 to the idea of phenomenology in 
the third division can only be accomplished by clarifying the “connection” between being and truth in terms of 
timeliness: “Yet a fully adequate existential interpretation of science cannot be carried out until the sense of being 
 3 
Assuredly, this would have discussed the logos peculiar to phenomenology.  Though Heidegger 
did not put everything in one place for us, we can still find clues in period lecture courses to 
present a cogent account of what he had in mind.
5
  
 
1. Time’s Two Possibilities of Judgment 
 The “unfolding and ripening” (Zeitigung) of “timeliness” (Zeitlichkeit) provides two 
basic possibilities for thematization and thus two basic possibilities for scientific discourse.
6
  On 
the one hand, entities can be unveiled in the manner of positive science and its apophantic 
discourse.  On the other hand, being itself can be unveiled in the manner of phenomenological 
science and its timely discourse.  Timeliness makes these two directions of unveiling both 
possible and necessary: “[T]imeliness is the root and the ground for both the possibility and, 
properly understood, the factical necessity of the objectification of the given entities and the 
given being.”7  Positive science moves in the everyday direction toward entities, and 
and the ‘connection’ between being and truth have been clarified in terms of the timeliness of existence.  The 
following deliberations are preparatory to the understanding of this central problematic, within which, moreover, the 
idea of phenomenology, as distinguished from the preliminary conception of it which we indicated by way of 
introduction will be developed for the first time.”  SZ 357/408. 
5
 Namely, we will have recourse to the following ways or works from the late 1920s: the 1925-26 Logik: 
Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Gesamtausgabe 21, ed. Walter Biemel (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
1976), hereafter L; from 1927 Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Gesamtausgabe 24, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm 
von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, rev. ed., 
trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), hereafter GP; the 1928 Metaphysische 
Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, Gesamtausgabe 26, ed. Klaus Held (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1978), The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984), hereafter MAL; and from 1929-30 Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt—Endlichket—
Einsamkeit, Gesamtausgabe 29/30, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1983), The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), hereafter GM.   
6
 In translating these and other key terms, I follow Daniel Dahlstrom’s conventions in Heidegger’s Concept 
of Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
7
 GP 456/321. What “objectification” means here is important: “Science is a cognizing for the sake of 
unveiledness as such. . . .  What is to be unveiled is the sole court of appeal of its determinability, of the concepts 
that are suitable for interpreting it.”  GP 455/320.  What is so “objectified” must be given beforehand and so is in no 
way the product of construction.  Nonetheless, it does involve projection: for positive science the “projection of the 
ontological constitution of a region of entities,” and for ontology the “projection of being upon the horizon of its 
understandability,” namely time.  GP 457-459/321-322. 
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phenomenological research moves in the counter tendency toward the projection of being in 
terms of timeliness.   
The basic act of phenomenological science is the “objectification” 
(Vergegenständlichung) of being.  Now, Heidegger does not mean that being is made into an 
object opposite a subject but only that it is understood in light of the self-unfolding of 
timeliness.
8
  Being and its timely sense are for the most part covered up, and phenomenological 
science has the task of bringing these phenomena to explicit givenness.  Heidegger does not 
blush when he calls this task “objectification,” because he means it in an essentially different 
sense than positive science.  While positive science unveils entities as such by projecting the 
ontological constitution of a region of entities, phenomenology unveils being as such by 
projecting it upon the timely horizon of its understandability.  But it is this horizon of 
understandability that the philosophical tradition has not methodologically secured: “The history 
of philosophy bears witness that all ontological interpretations, with regard to the horizon 
essentially necessary for them and to the assurance of that horizon, are more like a groping about 
than a definite methodical inquiry.”9  Why is it that this “basic act” is so overlooked?  Why is it 
that it “is delivered up to uncertainty and stands continually in danger of being reversed”?10  
Because it “must necessarily move in a projective direction that runs counter to everyday 
comportment towards entities.”  The two directions of unveiling, then, are rooted in the two 
8
 He does, however, hold back the third division in order to avoid the appearance of making being into an 
object opposite a subject.  See his comments in Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Gesamtausgabe 65, ed. 
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989), Contributions to Philosophy 
(From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 450/317, 
and “Der europäische Nihilismus,” in Nietzsche, vol. II (Pfullingen: Verlag Günther Neske, 1961), “European 
Nihilism,” in Nietzsche, vol. IV, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), 
194-195/141-142.   
9
 GP 459/322. 
10
 GP 459/323. 
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directions of Dasein: either (1) falling inauthenticity and the on-hand in general or (2) resolute 
authenticity and the phenomenon of timeliness. 
The difference between these two is secured through the method of “formal indication” 
(formale Anzeige).
11
  When philosophy is expressed it is subject to two persistent 
misinterpretations by the common understanding, which interprets what is meant as “on-hand” 
(vorhanden) and “isolated.”  That is to say, the common understanding falls into the “natural 
error” of understanding “any philosophical explication it encounters in its own terms, as an 
assertion about certain characteristic features of entities as on-hand.”12  Because it interprets 
philosophical phenomena as on-hand, it also takes “relations” to other phenomena to be 
properties of an “on-hand” entity.  Due to its “natural idleness,”13 common understanding thus 
passes over the authentic philosophical task of transformation in which Dasein is not regarded as 
an on-hand entity but as an opportunity for existential intensification through 
conceptualization.
14
  The authentic philosophic task of transforming Dasein likewise indicates 
that “the one and only originary interconnection of concepts is already established through 
Dasein itself.”15  Such an originary interconnection is unfolded in the self-articulation of 
timeliness.  Formal indication, which leads philosophy to transformation, shows itself as the 
proper antidote to the natural proclivity of the common understanding toward isolated 
11
 On formal indication, see Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: The 
University of California Press, 1993), especially 456; Steven Crowell, Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of 
Meaning (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 137-144; and Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Method: 
Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications,” Review of Metaphysics 47 (1994): 775-95.  Kisiel calls it “the very 
fulcrum of Being and Time,” though in the published divisions Heidegger is largely silent about its role. Genesis, 
172n4.   
12
 GM 430-431/297.  
13
 GM 423/292. 
14
 “[W]hat philosophy deals with only discloses itself at all within and from out of a transformation of 
human Dasein.”  GM 423/292. 
15
 GM 432/298. 
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objectification.  It serves as an invitation to turn authentically to the original phenomenon of 
timeliness and articulate its essential structures. 
Formal indication, then, shows the way to the differentiation of these two directions of 
judgment, either toward on-hand entities or the timely unfolding of being.  To move from the one 
to the other is a difficult task.  Heidegger notes phenomenology lacks not only the right words 
“but, above all, the right ‘grammar.’”16  Instead of a grammar fitted to on-hand things, what is 
needed is formal language fitted to the timely openness.  As Theodore Kisiel puts it, 
“Heidegger’s sense of formality is derived, not from a formal mathesis of objects linked to the 
substantifying tradition of philosophy, but from a non-objective gramma(on)tology of time’s 
tenses.”17  Preliminarily, then, we can say that scientific and everyday judgments concern 
decontextualized entities, but that phenomenological judgments concern the timely constitution 
of the openness in which entities can be disclosed.   
 
2. Scientific Judgments Miss the Timely Horizon 
 Scientific or positive judgments are fitted to on-hand entities.  Heidegger calls the 
circumspective interpretation that issues in such judgment, “deliberation,” and says it is founded 
on a structure of retention and awaiting.  The equipmental whole (the “towards-this”) is retained 
and the possibility (the “towards-which”) is awaited.  Within this timely structure, making-
present can bring something closer in interpretation.  Circumspective making-present “is 
grounded in a retention of that context of equipment with which Dasein concerns itself in 
16
 SZ 39/63. 
17
 “The Genetic Difference in Reading Being and Time,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 
(1995): 182.  Kisiel very densely but ably sketches the differences between the language of this temporal science 
and the language of traditional ontology: “The very fact that Being and Time stresses, and even overstresses, 
prepositional schematisms must be understood in the larger context of a comprehensive grammatology bent upon a 
thorough re-view and revision of the formal grammars of our classical languages, where the focus shifts from 
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awaiting a possibility.  That which has already been laid open in awaiting and retaining is 
brought closer by one’s deliberative making-present or envisaging.”18  To bring closer is “to let 
that in which something has an involvement, be seen circumspectively as this very thing.”19  For 
the interpretation to bring something close, it must fit itself to the being of that which is 
interpreted.   
The way the present is rooted in the future and in having been, is the existential-timely 
condition for the possibility that what has been projected in circumspective understanding 
can be brought closer in a making-present, and in such a way that the present can thus fit 
[anmessen] itself to what is encountered within the horizon of awaiting and retaining; this 
means that it must interpret itself in the schema of the as-structure. . . .  Like 
understanding and interpretation in general, the “as” is grounded in the ecstatico-
horizonal unity of timeliness.
20
 
 
Scientific judgments arise by a modification of this timely hermeneutical “as” of the 
understanding.  Instead of taking something as handy for some task within a field of reference, in 
science we focus on the entity as on-hand for inspection.  We register its properties and issue 
judgments about what it is.
21
  The sense of the judgment is borrowed, because it is derived from 
the timely hermeneutic synthesis in which the entity is originally uncovered.  The leveling of 
syntheses from hermeneutical “as” to apophantic “is” occurs in the withdrawal of the timely 
horizon of awaiting and retaining toward which something could have sense.  
The narrowing of interest that issues in a scientific judgment occurs in three overlapping 
stages.  (a) Proximately, we are immersed in the context of meaning deliberating with an entity 
substantives to middle-voiced infinitives, reflexives, double genitives, transitive-intransitive relations, and the 
exclamatory impersonals of happenings.”   
18
 SZ 359/411. 
19
 SZ 360/411.  Cf. SZ 33/56. 
20
 SZ 360/411.   
21
 Thomas Prufer characterizes this transition as the suppression of “the unthematic synthesis of something 
together with whatever we take it as (being) useful for” and its replacement “by the thematic predicative synthesis: 
saying something as (being) a characteristic of something.”  He relates these two syntheses as follows: “The 
predicative truth of something characterized as being so is secondary to and rooted in the prepredicative good of 
something taken as being useful for.”  Recapitulations: Essays in Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic 
University of America Press, 1993), 80, 81.   
 8 
in the mode of handiness.  Our understanding refers it to the totality of our involvements.  We 
simply employ the hammer for the sake of some task.  The hammer is embedded within the 
matrix of relations constitutive of our concernful being-in-the-world.  (b) Subsequently, we may 
say something about the hammer which involves a change in the entity’s mode from handiness 
to on-handness.
22
  We might say, for instance, “This hammer is heavy.”  The reference of the 
entity to the totality of our involvements withdraws and our preview only sees something in the 
mode of on-handness in the midst of what is handy.  The emergence of on-hand entities obscures 
the mode of handiness, and it enables discussion of an entity’s features, of its having a definite 
character.
23
  (c) But we can further draw on its being on-hand as such and then speak of its 
properties, saying, for instance, that it has certain chemical properties.  Here we are discussing 
the entity simply as a “what.”24   
This emergence of the on-hand in the flattening of the “as” trades on an abrupt timely 
shift in the understanding of being.
25
  We pass over the hammer’s handy kind of being, and look 
at (ansehen) the handy entity simply as on-hand.  Consequently the hammer loses its sense: 
We have now sighted something that is suitable for the hammer, not as a tool, but as a 
corporeal thing subject to the law of gravity.  The circumspective discourse of “too 
heavy” or “too light” no longer has any “sense” that is to say, the entity in itself, as we 
now encounter it, gives us nothing with relation to which [worauf] it could be “found” 
too heavy or too light.
26
 
 
Sense comes from the unfolding of the timely context of understanding and interpretation.  Thus, 
in this shift in understanding, the timely horizon of retaining the equipmental context and 
awaiting the possibility has been passed over.  Judgments arise when the horizon of sense 
22
 SZ 158/200.   
23
 In this regard, Hubert Dreyfus says that on-hand entities are decontextualized, revealing “context-free 
features and properties.”  Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1991), 84. 
24
 SZ 158/200. 
25
 “The understanding of being by which our concernful dealings with entities within-the-world have been 
guided has changed over.”  SZ 361/412. 
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recedes leaving the bare entity, but the sense of the judgment derives from the very horizon that 
is thereby missed. 
Though we have isolated three moments, there is a spectrum of gradations from a 
concerned understanding of a handy entity to its being taken as the object of a theoretical 
assertion.
27
  Accounts of the handy, discussions of events, reports, and the like cannot be reduced 
to bare theoretical assertions without falsification, since they are much closer than theoretical 
assertions to the origin in a concerned understanding. 
 
3. Phenomenological Judgments Articulate the Timely Horizon 
Phenomenological judgments do not allow the timely horizon to recede from view.  
Instead, they articulate the constitution of sense or the openness in which entities are accessible.  
The unfolding of timeliness always already opens the world in which we can encounter entities 
as handy or on-hand.  Timeliness accomplishes such an opening, because it is self-articulating; in 
its unfolding or ripening it articulates itself ecstatically and horizonally.  Time, as both horizonal 
and ecstatic, “unfolds itself, oscillating as a worlding [Welten].”28  Through this unfolding the 
world itself “is.”29 
Authentic timeliness is prior to divisions between subjective and objective or immanent 
and transcendent.  “Timeliness is not . . . an entity which first emerges from itself; its essence is 
unfolding in the unity of the ecstasies.”30  Heidegger thus identifies timeliness as “the primordial 
26
 SZ 361/412. 
27
 SZ 158/201. 
28
 MAL 270/209. 
29
 Cf. SZ 365/417: “In so far as Dasein unfolds itself, a world is too.  In unfolding itself with regard to its 
being as timeliness, Dasein is essentially ‘in a world,’ by reason of the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of that 
timeliness.  The world is neither on-hand nor handy, but unfolds itself in timeliness.  It ‘is,’ with the ‘outside-of-
itself’ of the ecstasies, ‘here.’” 
30
 SZ 329/377. 
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‘outside-itself’ in and for itself.”31  Due to this “ec-static,” outside-itself, character, Heidegger 
terms the threefold timely phenomena “ecstasies.”   
In unfolding, timeliness unfurls the basic directions for our existence.  Each of the three 
timely ecstasies carries us in a different horizonal schema, its “whereto” (Wohin).32  The 
horizonal schema of coming-towards is the for-the-sake-of-which; of having-been is in the face 
of which and to which; of making-present is the in-order-to.  The horizon of timeliness is the 
unity of these three schemata.  Such a unity makes sense and world possible.
33
 
The horizon of timeliness as a whole determines that toward-which factically existing 
entities are essentially disclosed. . . .  The horizonal unity of the schemata of these 
ecstasies makes possible the primordial way in which the relationships of the “in-order-
to” are connected with the “for-the-sake-of.”  This implies that on the basis of the 
horizonal constitution of the ecstatical unity of timeliness, there belongs to that entity 
which is in each case its own “here,” [i.e., Da-sein] something like a world that has been 
disclosed.
34
 
 
Sense, or what Heidegger calls “being,”35 is the “toward-which” of a projection that enables 
understandability and thus meaning.  Meaning, in turn, is the totality of references constitutive of 
world.  Timeliness, then, horizonally unites being (sense) and world (meaning) such that entities 
within the world can be meaningfully encountered or disclosed.
36
   
 Thus the relations of meaningfulness which determine the structure of the world 
are not a network of forms which a worldless subject has laid over some kind of material.   
What is rather the case is that factical Dasein, understanding itself and its world 
ecstatically in the unity of the here, comes back from these horizons to the entities 
encountered within them.  Coming back to these entities understandingly is the existential 
31
 SZ 329/377. 
32
 SZ 365/416. 
33
 “The existential-timely condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that timeliness, as an 
ecstatical unity, has something like a horizon.”  SZ 365/416. 
34
 SZ 365/416-417. 
35
 GP 429/302.   
36
 Heidegger’s language of horizon is frequently criticized, but I think it is a helpful formal indication of the 
connection of ecstatic timeliness and world; it suggests a non-static limit that determines and enables a finitude not 
subject to Hegelian dialectic.  For criticisms, see Kisiel, Genesis, 449-451, and John van Buren, The Young 
Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 363-367.  Dahlstrom 
provides a helpful treatment of horizon, Heidegger’s Concept of Truth, 333-337.    
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sense of letting them be encountered by making them present; that is why we call them 
entities “within-the-world.”37 
 
Dasein, constituted by timeliness, finds itself within a horizon and faced with disclosed entities.  
It can either turn to the entities disclosed within the horizon in scientific discourse or it can turn 
to the horizon itself in phenomenological discourse.   
Timeliness enables sense and thereby opens world for Dasein by serving as the ultimate 
context of understanding’s projection.  Time is self-interpreting and articulates itself in 
accordance with horizonal ecstasies, and therefore it serves as the end and source of projection.
38
   
Because the ecstatic-horizonal unity of timeliness is intrinsically self-projection pure and 
simple, because as ecstatic it makes possible all projecting upon . . . and represents, 
together with the horizon belonging to the ecstasis, the condition of possibility of a 
toward-which, an out-toward-which in general, it can no longer be asked upon what the 
schemata can on their part be projected, and so on in infinitum.
39
  
 
Phenomenology as it were listens in on the self-articulating of timeliness and brings it to 
disclosure and articulation.  Consequently, the propositions of this science are themselves 
temporal: “All the propositions of ontology are temporal propositions.  Their truths unveil 
structures and possibilities of being in the light of temporality.  All ontological propositions have 
the character of temporal truth, veritas temporalis.”40   
Phenomenological propositions articulate the complete unity of timeliness.  Heidegger 
calls them a priori propositions, because they lay bare what is always already unfolded in 
authentic timeliness.  To make this sense of completion clear, he even calls the “tense” at work 
37
 SZ 366/417. 
38
 The datability of discourse attests to this: “The fact that the structure of datability belongs essentially to 
what has been interpreted with the ‘now,’ and the ‘then,’ and the ‘on that former occasion,’ becomes the most 
elemental proof that what has thus been interpreted has originated in the timeliness which interprets itself.”  SZ 
408/460. 
39
 GP 437/307-308.  He continues: “The series, mentioned earlier, of projections as it were inserted one 
before the other—understanding of entities, projection upon being, understanding of being, projection upon time—
has its end at the horizon of ecstatic unity of timeliness. [ . . . ] But this end is nothing but the beginning and starting 
point for the possibility of all projecting.”  
40
 GP 460/323.   
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in phenomenological propositions and terms the a priori perfect.
41
  Disclosedness, thrownness, 
disposedness, and discoveredness are accordingly in the perfect tense, but so are all the formally-
indicated terms of the structure that lets entities be.  This leads Thomas Sheehan to say that 
Dasein, which is always already opened, should be translated as openedness.
42
  Timeliness 
unfolds ecstatically and horizonally and thereby always already opens the site in which we 
encounter things.  Phenomenological assertions articulate the timely constitution of this openness 
and thereby exhibit what makes entities accessible.
43
  Heidegger even takes to Latinate terms 
when speaking of timeliness as enabling this a priori openness.  In the following passage, for 
instance, he experiments with “praesens” to name the timely horizon of awaiting and retaining: 
The handiness of the handy, the being of these entities, is understood as praesens, a 
praesens which, as non-conceptually understandable, is already unveiled in the self-
projection of timeliness, by means of whose unfolding anything like existent dealings 
with the handy and on-hand become possible.
44
  
 
By means of praesens, entities can be available or unavailable, present or absent.
45
  The timely 
logos of phenomenology, then, articulates the openness in which everyday judgments and the 
judgments of science are possible.  Rather than a grammar of on-hand entities, Heidegger 
develops a grammar of timeliness’ dynamic unfolding that lets entities be.  Nor does this theme 
simply drop from view in his later thought.  As Heidegger tells us, timeliness or transcendence 
approached “from the truth of being” is called “appropriation” (Ereignis).46 
41
 SZ 85/117.  In a later marginal note to this passage, Heidegger says he finds precursors for this tense in 
both Aristotle’s ontology and Kant’s transcendental philosophy.  On the importance of this tense, see Kisiel, 
Genesis, 392-3 and 404. 
42
 See “Geschichtlichkeit/Ereignis/Kehre,” Existentia: Meletai Sophias 11 (2001): 242-246. 
43
 “Time is earlier than any possible earlier of whatever sort, because it is the basic condition for an earlier 
as such.  And because time as the source of all enablings (possibilities) is the earliest, all possibilities as such in their 
possibility-making function have the character of the earlier.  That is to say, they are a priori.”  GP 463/325. 
44
 GP 438-439/309.  Heidegger italicizes the whole passage. 
45
 GP 429-444/302-312. 
46
 Marginalia to SZ 440.  See Sheehan, “Kehre and Ereignis: A Prolegomenon to Introduction to 
Metaphysics,” in A Companion to Heidegger’s ‘Introduction to Metaphysics’, ed. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 15. 
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Conclusion 
Timeliness is self-interpreting and articulates itself in accord with the timely ecstasies and 
the ontological difference: “On the basis of timeliness there belongs to Dasein’s existence the 
immediate unity of the understanding of being and comportment toward entities.”47  It thus 
provides essentially two directions for inquiry: (1) we can follow the falling tendency of the 
everyday and thematize the on-hand in the manner of science; or (2) we can resolutely hold 
ourselves in the counter-tendency toward the horizon itself and thematize being in the manner of 
phenomenological philosophy.
48
  Understanding can be developed in interpretation either (1) 
inauthentically or (2) authentically; it can consequently issue in either (1) scientific assertions 
about entities or (2) phenomenological ones about timeliness and being. 
Because no readily discernible feature of an assertion identifies it as scientific or 
phenomenological, the appearance of a performative contradiction and methodological naïveté is 
unavoidable.  If the timely difference is missed, Heidegger’s phenomenological propositions 
appear to be vague assertions about entities, and he is understandably criticized for a “wool 
gathering” that runs counter to the rigor of scientific logos.  If, on the contrary, the difference is 
cultivated in self-transformation, the timely sense and its grammar shine with a clarity and rigor 
of their own.
49
  Then we can see that Heidegger’s phenomenological judgments contextualize but 
47
 GP 454/319. 
48
 Cf. Kisiel’s characterization: “The vectorial thrust of time’s transcendence and counter-thrust of its 
decadence and degeneration are . . . the ultimate basis for the existential polar opposites that structure the self in 
Being and Time: my-self and they-self, authentic and inauthentic, originative timeliness and everydayness.”  “The 
New Translation of Sein und Zeit: A Grammatological Lexicographer’s Commentary,” in Heidegger’s Way of 
Thought: Critical and Interpretative Signposts by Theodore Kisiel, ed. Alfred Denker and Marion Heinz (New York: 
Continuum, 2002), 76. 
49
 Ambiguously, a philosophical proposition provides two directives: it both indicates the timely 
transformation of Dasein and signifies the on-hand.  To understand it rightly entails following the indicated 
conceptualization oneself; to misunderstand it entails reducing everything it talks about to an object.  The following 
passage from 1926 notes the difference that we must master: “All assertions about the being of Dasein, all 
propositions about time, all propositions within the problematic of temporality have, as pronounced propositions, the 
character of indication [Anzeige]: they indicate [indizieren] only Dasein, while as pronounced propositions they 
 14 
do not annul scientific judgments.  No ladder is kicked away.  Rather, Heidegger recognizes that 
there is more to logos than logic, because there is necessarily more to phenomena than what is 
merely on-hand.  
 Later Heidegger becomes disillusioned with the analogy between scientific judgments 
and phenomenological ones.  It gives rise to the unwanted appearance that being is made an 
object opposite a subject.
50
  He accordingly desires to move beyond phenomenology as a 
research program by developing a manner of doing phenomenology on the basis of thrownness 
rather than projection.  He turns to a more poetic discourse attuned by fundamental moods.
51
  
And yet, the analogy with poetry comes with its own danger, and his later thought can appear 
merely mystifying.  Even after 1959, Heidegger complained to Pöggeler that “while he had 
gathered all the basic thoughts, he still lacked the language—one cannot just poetize.”52  It is for 
this reason that Gadamer is perhaps justified, against every hint Heidegger provides, to 
emphasize that formal indication — and we might add the timeliness of phenomenological 
judgments — is a fruitful manner of doing philosophy alongside Heidegger, early and late: “All 
of us should ever be relearning that when Heidegger spoke in his early works of ‘formal 
indication,’ he already formulated something that holds for the whole of his thought.”53 
 
nevertheless above all signify the on-hand; they indicate Dasein and the structure of Dasein and of time, they 
indicate the possible understanding and the possible conceivability of the structure of Dasein, which is accessible in 
such understanding.” L 410.   
50
 See note 8 above. 
51
 Cf. SZ 162/205: “In ‘poetical’ discourse, the communication of the existential possibilities of one’s 
disposedness can become an aim in itself, and this amounts to a disclosing of existence.” 
52
 Otto Pöggeler, Martin Heidegger’s Path of Thinking, trans. Daniel Magurshak and Sigmund Barber 
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1987), 287. 
53
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Martin Heidegger’s One Path,” trans. P. Christopher Smith, in Reading 
Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany, New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 33.  What Gadamer has in mind can be gathered from the 
following words: “The ‘formal indication’ points us in the direction in which we are to look.  We must learn to say 
what shows up there and learn to say it in our own words.”   
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